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HISTORY'S CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 
.Jeanne L. Schroeder* 
LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE. By 
James A. Brundage. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987. 
Pp. xxiv, 674. $45. 
In Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe, James 
Brundage1 has written a book that is important for anyone interested 
in developing a feminist jurisprudence. This exhaustive study demon-
strates that certain trends in contemporary feminist legal theories that 
seek to explain the feminine and masculine nature of and bases for 
contemporary law are both ahistorical and fundamentally 
conservative. 2 
The trends of feminist jurisprudence to which I refer are those 
which Robin West has identified as "cultural" and "radical" femi-
nism. 3 As described by West, both these viewpoints accept that the 
definition of human nature (which encompasses the contemporary 
American masculine stereotype) which underlies the dominant schools 
of American jurisprudence is in fact true of men. In other words, men 
actually are the autonomous individuals prior to the community iden-
• Visiting Associate Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
A.B. 1975, Williams College; J.D. 1978, Stanford Law School.-Ed. I am indebted to David 
Gray Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, A.W.B. Simpson, and Paul M. Shupak for comments on earlier 
drafts of this book review. 
1. Hall Professor of History, University of Kansas. 
2. I present this analysis more thoroughly in Schroeder, Feminism Historicized: Medieval 
Misogynist Stereotypes in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 15 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming). 
3. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). Like all models, West's 
cultural-radical feminist dichotomy is in some ways simplistic and distorted in that she does not 
attempt to identify the divergence of views of feminists within these groups, nor does she discuss 
legal scholars who consider themselves feminists yet do not fall within these categories. I believe, 
however, that like any good model, this simplification serves a useful analytical function. 
Although I do not believe that West's attempt to link both of these schools of thought with her 
"connection thesis" is successful, I believe that her dichotomy enables us to examine common 
tendencies among different writers, even though no one writer conforms exactly with the theory 
supposedly promulgated by a particular school. Feminist jurisprudence is a new field of inquiry 
and is in an extremely fluid stage. It is wrong to conclude from the use of West's dichotomy that 
feminist legal scholars have solidified into competing schools of thought, or that there are not 
feminist legal scholars working outside of the two "schools" identified by West who are challeng-
ing the concept of feminine values. See, e.g., Come//, The Doubly Prized World, 15 Cornell L. 
Rev. - (forthcoming); Cornell & Thurshwell, Feminism, Negativity, lntersubjectivity, 5 PRAXIS 
INTL. 484 (1986); Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989). There is even 
more variety among feminists in other disciplines. I do believe that West's characterizations, or 
perhaps caricaturizations, accurately describe certain tendencies in much feminist legal scholar-
ship which I find disturbing. 
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tified in classical liberal political philosophy.4 Furthermore, both 
viewpoints accept that the contemporary American feminine sterotype 
is "true" of women: it is either natural, or the inevitable psychological 
result of the fact that women are the primary caregivers to children 
(the cultural feminist view), or it has been imposed upon women by 
men (the radical feminist view). Thus women are, or are forced to be, 
nurturing, connective, and relational, and have an ethic of care, as 
opposed to the masculine ethic of right. 5 Cultural feminist jurispru-
dence embraces and privileges the feminine stereotype and seeks to 
reinterpret legal issues in light of these "feminine" values. 6 Radical 
feminist jurisprudence rejects these values, arguing they are imposed 
by patriarchy to keep women weak and subordinate.7 Consequently, 
radical feminism, so defined, seems to privilege certain "masculine" 
virtues, such as individuation and empowerment. 8 
I believe that both views remain conservative even though they 
have taken the single gesture of reevaluating, and deciding whether to 
accept or reject, the feminine stereotype. They remain conservative 
because they have not yet taken the double gesture of reexamining the 
stereotype of masculinity and the concepts of gender difference formed 
by our patriarchal society. Patriarchy's stereotype of femininity is de-
fined as the mirror image or negative of masculinity - the construct 
of "woman" exists purely to define "man."9 By not concentrating first 
on men's definition of themselves, which is the basis of the concept of 
femininity, these feminists are left with a choice of embracing or re-
jecting an externally generated definition of the feminine self. We will 
only successfully discover or create a truly feminist definition of the 
feminine self on which to base a jurisprudence of gendered justice if we 
4. West, supra note 3, at 14. 
5. West, supra note 3, at 18, 27-30, 36-38, 49-50. West notes, but ultimately finds inadequate, 
the Gilligan-Chodorow explanation of gender difference resulting from the fact that women raise 
children. Id. at 17-18, 20-21. MacKinnon's criticism of the "feminine" stereotype seems to be 
largely that it is socially imposed and not freely chosen. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A 
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989). 
6. See, for example, Leslie Bender's analysis of the lack of a duty to save in tort law, in which 
she suggests that a jurisprudence based on an "ethic of care" might generate a different result. 
Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988). 
7. C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 109-10. See also MacKinnon's discussion of the "femi-
nine voice" allegedly identified by Carol Gilligan as the voice of the victim. MacKinnon, Femi-
nist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 73-74 
(1985). I fear that both Gilligan and MacKinnon accept the masculine characterization of the 
moral differences between American girls and boys which Gilligan believes she has identified. 
8. West, supra note 3, at 29-30, 42. 
9. Joan Williams expresses a criticism similar to mine as to the cultural feminists' (specifi-
cally, Carol Gilligan's) unquestioning acceptance of the stereotype of men "as empty vessels of 
capitalist virtues - competitive and individualistic and espousing liberal ideology to justify this 
approach to life." Williams, supra note 3, at 841. Even though I generally agree with West's 
description ofMacKinnon's work, which I believe relies too heavily on accepting the masculine 
view of masculinity, MacKinnon at her best is passionately committed to the problem of how 
women can define and create themselves rather than accepting the reality imposed upon them. 
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simultaneously deconstruct the masculinist definition of the masculine 
self. 
By saying current feminist legal history is "ahistorical," I mean 
two things. First, both cultural and radical feminist theories are based 
largely on the personal experiences of professional-class individuals in 
the late twentieth century and do not take into account the very differ-
ent experiences - and I would say selves - of people living in other 
cultures and in other historical periods. Consequently, these theories 
are blind to the extent to which the self is culturally determined:10 
Second, because they accept modem cultural descriptions of per-
sonality as universal, modem "feminist" jurisprudences do not recog-
nize and analyze the historical roots of the prejudices on which they 
are based. The distinction between the historical and the universal is 
very hard to grasp if all we have to go by is our own experience. Our 
experience is historically produced, and to develop a jurisprudence 
based upon experience without examining the culture and thought of 
our intellectual grandparents is poor methodology. 
A study of history indicates that in different cultures and in differ-
ent times people held stereotypes of masculinity, and therefore of femi-
ninity, radically different from the dominant modem American 
stereotypes which I fear so many feminists erroneously accept. Medie-
val society conceived of the masculine self in many of the ways which 
feminists now see as uniquely female or as defined by men as feminine. 
Brundage's study of medieval sex law enables us to analyze how these 
gender stereotypes were played out in the development of legal theory. 
Medieval men saw themselves not as autonomous individuals, but as 
creatures bound by their very nature to the community. Men felt 
bound not only by ties of lineage and feudal obligation, which were 
believed to be both natural and divinely ordained, but also by actual 
physical dependence to the other men who comprised their 
community.11 
In patriarchal societies, men as subjects define women as objects as 
a means of self-definition.12 In order for men in any given society to 
10. That is not to say that many other feminists have not been keenly aware of the culturally-
determined nature of their perspective and criticism. One insight shared by most feminists is the 
importance of the role of society in forming gender. This idea was expressed first, and still most 
succinctly, by Simone de Beauvoir: "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman." S. DE 
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H. Parshley trans. 1968). Indeed, Catharine MacKinnon 
defends her method precisely because it is culturally (and individually) specific. See, e.g., C. 
MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 106-25. My criticism is that these feminists have not yet gone far 
enough in that certain of their unexamined assumptions serve to reinstate the very gender catego-
ries they wish to deconstruct. 
11. Schroeder, supra note 2. 
12. Feminists of many different theoretical approaches have described this process by which 
men use women as mirrors. For example, Luce Iragaray develops this thesis in the context of 
psychological theory in Speculum of the Other Woman. L. IRAGARAY, SPECULUM OF THE 
OTHER WOMAN (1985). Catharine MacKinnon makes a similar point in a political context. C. 
MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 122. 
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ascribe the characteristics which their society privileges to masculin-
ity, they must define the negatives of these "virtues" as feminine. Con-
sequently, the medieval male view of the feminine self which underlies 
early medieval law had many characteristics of the modem male view 
of the masculine self. Medieval women were considered selfish, indi-
vidualistic, and outside the order of society. This vision coincides, in 
the High Middle Ages, with the apogee of economic power and status 
for women.13 Meanwhile, the "feminine" values of autonomy and sex-
ual equality were adopted by canon jurisprudes as the bases for revolu-
tionizing medieval marriage law.14 
Brundage's study enables us to follow and analyze how this pro-
cess influenced the remarkable developments during the High Middle 
Ages in the law most obviously related to gender - the law of mar-
riage, rape, and other issues of sexual regulation. This process had 
previously been presented in other contexts by historians such as 
David Herlihy in economic history15 and Georges Duby in cultural 
history. 16 Very briefly, in the early Middle Ages, sex law was consid-
ered largely a secular matter. It reflected the dominant, and I would 
argue masculine, value of privileging the community over the individ-
ual. Marriage, divorce, and even rape were collective decisions of a 
social group, the extended noble family, overlords, and retainers, 
which could be imposed upon the individual.17 
In the High Middle Ages, the Church sought to impose an alter-
nate theory of the law of sexuality based on concepts of individuality 
including the rights of individual women. The canon lawyers studied 
by Brundage eventually concluded that marriage was a decision of in-
dividual conscience, not of the community. Specifically, a family 
could not force a woman into a legally binding marriage. Rape was 
13. David Herlihy's economic research indicates that women's economic status was at its 
highest in the eleventh century, with some decrease in the twelfth century (and, of course, sub-
stantial regional variations). Women's power and status fell as the patrilinear family became the 
dominant structure by the thirteenth century. Herlihy identifies the rise of the patrilinear family 
as a response to the changes in marriage law imposed by the Church in the late eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, which made obsolete the old ways families preserved inheritance. Herlihy, 
Land, Family, and Women in Continental Europe: 701-1200. in WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY 
10 (S. Stuard ed. 1976) [hereinafter Herlihy, Land, Family, and Women]; Herlihy, The Making 
of the Medieval Family: Symmetry, Structure, and Sentiment, J. FAM. HIST., Summer 1983, at 
116, 124-26 (1983) [hereinafter Herlihy, The Making of the Medieval Family]. Stuard agrees that 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries were the "watershed" of women's economic status. Stuard, 
Introduction to WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY 10 (S. Stuard ed. 1976). Georges Duby believes 
this process may have started for French women as early as the mid-eleventh century. G. DUBY, 
THE KNIGHT, THE PRIEST, AND THE LADY 99-104 (1983); see also infra note 49. 
14. Schroeder, supra note 2. 
15. See D. HERLIHY, MEDIEVAL HOUSEHOLDS (1985); Herlihy, Land, Family and Women, 
supra note 13; Herlihy, The Making of the Medieval Family, supra note 13. 
16. G. DUBY, supra note 13. 
17. Schroeder, supra note 2. This is not to suggest that in this earlier time the Church was 
not concerned with the moral regulation of sexual behavior or that Church courts and theolo-
gians never concerned themselves with sex-related legal issues. 
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recognized as a crime committed against an individual woman rather 
than merely against her family. Woman, although inferior to man in 
almost all ways, was created in the image of God and shared a com-
mon spiritual destiny with man. Consequently, canon jurisprudential 
theory determined that women should have equal rights with men in a 
variety of sexual issues. By the end of this period, the Church was 
successful in imposing these new theories of sex law upon the laity, at 
least in the case of marriage law. 18 Other scholars have argued that as 
secular society internalized the new teachings on marriage and sex, the 
structure of the family and inheritance rights changed to women's dis-
advantage, so that by the late Middle Ages, women's economic status 
was much lower than it was during the High Middle Ages. 19 
Another movement, which I believe was related, happened simul-
taneously. The twelfth century is frequently identified with the "dis-
covery of the individual." About this time, the concepts of privacy 
and individuality began to be seen as attractive values.20 This trend 
continued until the end of the Renaissance where something resem-
bling our modem concept of individuality as a positive (that is, mascu-
. line) value was recognized.21 As a consequence, society by that time 
divided the world into public and private spheres. Women, now iden-
tified with the stereotype of the nurturing mother, were relegated to 
the private world. As Joan Kelly-Gadol has noted, the Renaissance, 
usually cited as a high point in the history of the concept of freedom, 
was for women a low point. 22 
Thus, a feminist analysis of the gender politics implicit in the de-
velopment of legal structures presented in Brundage's study suggests 
that the errors of the current cultural and radical feminist agendas are 
twofold. First, these trends in modem feminist jurisprudences fail to 
18. Pp. 194, 278·79; see also G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 282-84. The Church was not as 
successful in establishing exclusive jurisdiction over certain areas of sexual Jaw, such as the Jaw of 
rape. Pp. 578-79. 
19. See supra note 13. 
20. Volume II of A History of Private Life traces this development specifically in the area of 
household organization. 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: REVELATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL 
WORLD (G. Duby ed., A. Goldhammer trans. 1988) [hereinafter A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE]. 
See also Charles Homer Haskins' cia5sic intellectual history, The Renaissance of the Twelfth 
Century. C.H. HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TwELFTH CENTURY (1927). 
21. Although his extreme views seem almost a caricature today, the classic study identifying 
the birth of the ideal of individuality with the Italian Renaissance is Jacob Burkhardt's The 
Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy. J. BURKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAIS-
SANCE IN ITALY (1878). As discussed above, modem medieval historians see the development of 
this ideal as a process that began around the twelfth century. See supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text. Caroline Walker Bynum, however, argues that although the seeds of individuality as a 
positive virtue may be identifiable in the twelfth century, twelfth-century society remained funda-
mentally communitarian. Bynum, Did the Twelfth Century Discover the Individual?, reprinted in -
C.W. BYNUM, JESUS AS MOTHER 82 (1982). It would take until the Renaissance for society to 
emphasize individualism instead of communitarianism. 
22. Kelly-Gadol, The Social Relations of the Sexes: Methodological Implications of Women's 
History, in FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY 15, 17 (S. Harding ed. 1987). 
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recognize fully the cultural basis for their theories of masculinity and 
femininity. Second, they implicitly or explicitly assume that adoption 
of a feminine jurisprudence which takes into account (either by 
unquestioning acceptance or by rejection) certain values because they 
have been labeled as "feminine," will lead to a less patriarchal and 
more free feminine world. In fact, history has shown that what we 
now regard as "feminine" values have been adopted in the past as 
"masculine" values and what some feminist legal theorists have seized 
upon as the most likely tools of establishing gender justice were at one 
time used as tools of patriarchy and oppression. This is the central 
insight which may be gained from a feminist analysis of the material 
Brundage has gathered in his book. 
I am afraid I might be giving my readers the misimpression that 
Brundage's book is either a feminist or an anti-feminist tract, or that it 
is even primarily a discussion of the sociology of the Middle Ages as 
viewed from a twentieth-century perspective. Brundage does not en-
gage in an express analysis of gender politics. On the contrary, Brun-
dage tries to present the theories of medieval jurists, with particular 
attention given to the late eleventh through early thirteenth centuries, 
as closely as possible in their own terms, with explanation as needed for 
the understanding of a modern audience. Although Brundage defi-
nitely has a point of view on many of the issues he explores, such as his 
belief that the concept of ritual pollution or impurity underlies much 
of medieval sex law23 and his virtual silence on economic arguments 
favored by certain other medievalists, he generally tries to present the 
material as it was written.24 
This is significant because, as Brundage points out in his preface, 
most of the materials from this central period have not been published 
in modern times and are not generally available (p. xx). In addition, 
although Brundage feels a need to apologize for his use of secondary 
materials in the portions of the book dealing with the earlier and later 
Middle Ages (p. xx), he has done an invaluable service to those of us 
who are interested in studying this era but whose foreign language 
skills are poor. Medieval historiography has been dominated by Euro-
23. P. 150. Brundage discusses the concept of ritual impurity and pollution throughout the 
book. See, e.g., pp. 214-16 (discussing perceived pollution of intercourse as an important ration-
ale for the imposition of mandatory clerical celibacy). 
24. For example, the Church reform of marriage and sex law in the High Middle Ages is 
related to other church "reforms" often referred to as "Gregorian,'' after the late eleventh-cen-
tury reformist pope, Pope Gregory VII. These reforms included the struggle for dominance in 
many affairs between the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. Brundage notes this connection 
throughout and occasionally refers to theories which suggest that the change in marriage law was 
a cynical attempt of the Church to wrest economic power from the nobility. Brundage con-
cludes, however, that although the changes in marriage law may have had the effect of shifting 
wealth from the nobility to the clergy, this was probably not the clergy's conscious intention. Pp. 
586-87. This is consistent with the way medieval scholars debated issues concerning marriage 
law. 
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pean scholars and the amount of material which has been written in, 
or translated into, English is frustratingly limited, although in recent 
years there seems to be a welcome publishing trend toward translating 
the works of many French medievalists such as Georges Duby and 
Fernand Braudel. Because Brundage has slogged through materials 
that have never been published (at least in modern times), has gath-
ered together a tremendous amount of other material that has not pre-
viously been available in one place, and has presented material that 
has not generally been available in English, his book is a necessary 
addition to English language medieval scholarship, and I expect it will 
become required reading for anyone studying this field. 25 
Moreover, Brundage's style is admirably clear and readable, char-
acteristics often sadly lacking in legal scholarship, but more common 
in historical writing. A historical survey of the development of a par-
ticular legal theory runs the risk of being tediously repetitive, a risk for 
which Brundage needlessly apologizes (p. xx). Brundage has met this 
challenge and has produced a book that is consistently fascinating. He 
has also, almost as successfully, met the greater challenge of writing a 
book on sexual issues while avoiding prurience or, maybe worse, 
coyness or genteelness. 26 
Nevertheless, certain limitations in the book's approach may be 
25. Consequently, the scope of Brundage's book, and thus this review, is limited in several 
ways. First, it is limited to Western Europe. By this Brundage seems to mean primarily the area 
included in the modem Common Market countries other than Greece and Spain, with special 
emphasis on the areas included in modem France, Italy, and Germany. Second, it is limited to 
the law applicable to Catholic Europeans and, after the Reformation, a brief discussion of Protes-
tants; it excludes Jews, heretics, and pagans (except to the extent they influenced Catholic 
thought), Eastern Orthodox Christians, and Moslems. Finally, it is limited almost entirely to 
discussion of the noble and clerical orders of society, with little discussion of the various free and 
servile classes of the peasantry or the merchant and skilled trade (guild) classes of the cities. 
Although the laws discussed by Brundage were applicable to all classes in society, these laws 
were concerned primarily with the concerns of the two ruling orders. Very little remains of the 
other classes written in their own words, and the upper orders did not consider them a suffi-
ciently important subject about which to write. Presumably, substantial property, demographi-
cal and court records, as well as personal correspondence and diaries, survive from this period 
which could serve as sources for a greater understanding of the legal life of the mass of the 
population. Several scholars, including Barbara Hanawalt, David Herlihy, and Georges Duby, 
have tried to organize some of this material to enable a better understanding of the economic 
reality of the medieval ages. But the life of the commoner in this period still remains largely 
unknown to us. Consequently, Brunda3e does not discuss in detail certain aspects of medieval 
marriage which would have concerned the lower classes more than the upper orders, such as the 
permissibility of marriage between the various classes. For example, could a colona (a half-free 
woman) marry a servus (an unfree man) or a villein (a free peasant)? What about marriages 
between ministeriales (people who were technically of an unfree class but who served as 
chamberlains, ministers, castellans, and in other positions of wealth and power) and vavossars 
(lower nobility)? Nor does Brundage discuss whether a serf, or indeed any person bound by 
feudal obligation, could legally marry without the consent of her feudal lord. Even if a servile 
marriage contracted without a lord's consent was legally binding, was the serf still subject to 
punishment and taxes for this infraction? 
26. I did find some of his efforts to avoid repetition, such as finding a different term to de-
scribe what was considered a deviant heterosexual sexual position each time the subject is dis-
cussed, rather cloying. But this is a minor cavil. 
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initially disturbing to legal scholars. These are Brundage's insufficient 
discussion of the nature of his project and his limited definition of 
what constitutes "law." 
By failure to discuss his project, I mean that Brundage does not 
expressly disclose his underlying presumptions and prejudices, does 
not define his terms, does not explain his choice of subject matter, and, 
as I will discuss more thoroughly below, might be criticized for per· 
haps giving a misleading description of the scope of his book. The 
reader is forced to try to draw inferences as to what Brundage is doing, 
often leading to frustration, if not misunderstanding. Perhaps legal 
education gives one a heightened awareness of the importance of pre· 
cisely delineating one's terms and communicating one's parameters. 
Brundage is not completely successful in this respect. 
To me, and I expect to most women, the most glaring example of 
Brundage's failure to explain his project is his total silence on the sub· 
ject of abortion.27 Not only are the issues of sex and abortion inextri· 
cably linked, 28 but abortion is one of the most hotly contested issues of 
sex law today. This omission is so remarkable that it cries out for an 
explanation. The decision was not necessarily wrong, but the various 
reasons for omitting the discussion have modem political and theoreti· 
cal overtones, and are based on assumptions which should have been 
explained. I found myself constantly wondering what Brundage's rea· 
saning was, and what this implied about his thesis of law, his attitude 
toward women, and the reliability of his analysis. 
I can imagine at least three possible reasons for Brundage's omis· 
sion of any substantive discussion of abortion, one of which I consider 
legitimate, one of which I consider illegitimate, and one of which I 
consider neutral. First, I am sympathetic with a decision to omit a 
discussion of abortion because of its very complexity and the need to 
circumscribe the scope of the book. Brundage could not cover all 
legal issues relating to the law of sexuality over so broad a historical 
period in one book - the book is close to 700 pages as it is. Because a 
discussion of abortion involves not merely legislation concerning sexu· 
ality, but various moral, philosophical, and theological debates as to 
the nature of human life, autonomy, bodily integrity, women's nature, 
and sexuality, to name a few, it might best be left for a second book 
which can explore these issues more thoroughly. In addition, the de· 
bate on abortion has produced much historical research in recent years 
and Brundage may have justifiably felt that another book on this sub· 
27. Brundage uses the word "abortion" only once in the entire 674-page book, in a footnote 
which discusses the reasons behind the Church's condemnation of "deviant" coital positions. 
The footnote discusses whether "deviant" positions were condemned because they were too plea-
surable, because they were considered bestial, or because they hampered procreation as did con-
traceptives and abortion. P. 163 n.160. I found this reference only because of the book's 
excellent index. 
28. This would have been even more of a truism in the Middle Ages than today. 
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ject was not as urgently needed, especially when there were other areas 
of medieval sex law which had not been adequately explored and 
which might be relevant to the current debate. In other words, this 
decision may have resulted from a sensitivity to the importance and 
complexity of the abortion issue and the practical need to limit the 
scope of his work. 
A second reason for omitting a discussion of the law of abortion is 
one I would reject: that abortion policy is not fundamentally a policy 
of sex law. It is not news that attitudes toward abortion, although 
often framed in terms of "right to life" are, in fact, reflective of under-
lying views of sexuality and the role of women. On a more prosaic 
level, even today, the leading cause of pregnancy is heterosexual inter-
course - indeed, as Brundage presents in exhaustive length through-
out the book, most medieval theorists believed procreation to be the 
only, or at least the primary, moral justification for sexual activity.29 
To discuss procreation as the justification for the legality of marriage 
without discussing one of the primary means of thwarting procreation, 
i.e., abortion, is strange. Indeed, in this context Brundage does discuss 
the law of contraception, albeit briefly.30 Thus, Brundage's decision 
might have been based on an insensitivity to the nature of the issue, a 
decision which would make me question Brundage's judgment and 
other decisions throughout the book. 
A third possible reason for this omission, which I will develop 
presently, may stem from Brundage's decision to allow the canon 
scholars he is studying to define the field for themselves. Thus, Brun-
dage's medieval clients, and not Brundage himself, have set the 
agenda. If this is the reason for omitting any discussion of abortion, 
then the omission itself is part of the text, and, therefore, worth ana-
lyzing explicitly.31 
29. See, e.g., pp. 197, 279-81. 
30. See, e.g., p. 358. 
31. Other omissions which could have been explained are the absence of any extended discus-
sion of the property law of marriage (except for passing references to the issue of whether or not 
dowries or bride prices were considered necessary components of a binding marriage, see pp. 275, 
344-45) and the law of legitimization of children and inheritance. Medieval marriages (at least 
marriages of the noble class) were to a very large extent property matters - and property mat-
ters of extended families, not individuals. How property was distributed and who was permitted 
to inherit were, and would have been considered at the time, fundamental to any marriage law 
issue. 
This is especially true if one accepts a commonly offered economic theory of the reasons 
underlying certain changes in marriage law propounded by canon lawyers in the eleventh 
through thirteenth centuries. According to this theory, the Church was intentionally attempting 
to diminish the economic power of the great medieval noble families as compared to the Church. 
See supra note 24. This goal was served by interfering with the nobility's ability to use marriage 
as a way of cementing alliances. This was done by forbidding families from contracting mar-
riages for their members without the individual consent of the married couple, adopting very 
broad definitions of incest which prohibited marriages between closely affiliated families, and 
prohibiting divorce which enabled political marriages to be dissolved to reflect shifts in dynastic 
politics. Once again, even if these subjects were omitted purely out of the practical necessity of 
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The canon legal theorists themselves may not have viewed abor-
tion as an important issue of the law of sexuality, in contrast to what 
many moderns think. Or, abortion might not have been considered a 
burning issue of any branch of law by the decretists. If this were true, 
it would be anachronistic to include a discussion of abortion in a book 
which tries to present the legal theories of the Middle Ages as they 
were understood in their own time. 
Georges Duby has suggested that medieval penitentialists writing a 
generation before the first decretists did not include a discussion of 
contraception in their works involving marriage and other sexual rela-
tions. 32 Rather, this subject was included in the same works as those 
which covered abortion - that is, in discussions of murder and vio-
lence. 33 If Duby is correct, then is Brundage being internally inconsis-
tent by discussing, albeit briefly, the law of contraception in a work 
that purports to study medieval sex law on its own terms? The avoid-
ance-of-anachronism argument would seem, then, to support exclu-
sion of any discussion of both abortion and contraception but not one 
without the other. More importantly, however, there is some histori-
cal justification for including a discussion of abortion even in a study 
that seeks to take medieval sex law in its own terms. Gratian, for 
example, did include a hypothetical about abortion in his Decretum, in 
a section which was occasionally published separately as the Treatise 
of Marriage; 34 and Innocent III, one of the popes whom Brundage 
believes to have been particularly important in the development of ca-
non sex law, also issued at least one opinion condemning abortion.35 
Were these two the exceptions in the canon sex law literature? In any 
event, even if I have guessed correctly as to why Brundage excluded 
abortion from his book, a brief discussion of Brundage's methodology 
in his foreword, or at least in a footnote would have been useful.36 
If this is Brundage's reason for omitting a discussion of abortion, it 
reflects the most serious limitation of the book's scope from a jurispru-
dential perspective- the author's limited definition as to what is law. 
As is fairly typical among nonlawyers (and unfortunately all too com-
mon among lawyers), Brundage uses the term "law" to mean legisla-
tion and the semi-official pronouncements of legal scholars in the 
limiting the scope of the book, rather than out of insensitivity to the interrelationships between 
these issues, it would have been helpful for Brundage to have explained this more clearly. 
32. G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 62. 
33. Id. 
34. See Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in THE MORALITY OF ABORTION 20 
(J. Noonan ed. 1970). 
35. Id. 
36. Brundage does make clear that the issues of marital property rights, legitimacy, and in-
heritance always remained within the jurisdiction of secular courts throughout the Middle Ages, 
even after the Church imposed its jurisdiction over other aspects of family law. Pp. 319, 409, 
482-84, 578-79. This was, therefore, not a subject explicated by the canonists Brundage is study-
ing and is logically excluded from the book. 
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canons, papal decisions, and other works which Brundage discusses in 
loving, and fascinating, detail. He does not include in his concept of 
law the actual legal structure of society - that is, law as it is actually 
lived, perceived, and enforced in the community through litigation 
and custom.37 This decision not to examine anything but "black-letter 
law" is particularly true for the period Brundage covers in greatest 
detail - the late eleventh through thirteenth centuries, the period 
about which Brundage makes his greatest contribution. 
This period, often referred to by various flattering titles such as the 
"High Middle Ages" or the "twelfth-century renaissance,"38 was ape-
riod of great intellectual activity and changes in social structure, the 
status of women, and the jurisdiction and power of the Catholic 
Church. As discussed above, during this period, the Church, in large 
part through the efforts of the canon lawyers studied by Brundage, 
reexamined its position of the early Middle Ages that sex and marriage 
were primarily secular and private, to be governed by families and the 
secular government, with the Church's religious pronouncements on 
sexual behavior being moral, but not legal, exhortations relevant to the 
state of man's soul. By the end of this period, medieval society had 
adopted the Church's new view under which the Church achieved ex-
cfosive legal jurisdiction (both as to what we would call forum and 
subject matter jurisdiction) over certain fundamental issues of mar-
riage and sex law (pp. 223-25). During this transition period, both the 
secular and ecclesiastical courts competed for jurisdiction, enforcing 
radically different concepts of marriage law.39 
Brundage's entire analysis of this period, however, is limited to the 
consideration of the doctrines of the canon lawyers, i.e., the law 
professors he refers to as the "decretists" or "decretalists" (because 
they edited and analyzed collections of papal decisions known as de-
cretals ), and of the reformist popes, whose textbooks, treatises, and 
legal opinions developed the theories which, by the beginning of the 
37. A rejection of a definition of "law" as limited to statutes, cases, and so on, is implicit in 
the feminist critique of the public-private right distinction in American law and the suspicion of 
the use of a "right to privacy" as the basis for a right to abortion. For example, I interpret one of 
Catharine MacK.innon's central theses in Toward a Feminist Theory of the State as the identifica-
tion of a "private" realm (family, home, sex, and so on) which is separate and distinguishable 
from the "public" or "political" realm, and the recognition that the relegation of women to this 
private realm is itself a fundamentally political act. Consequently, that which is deemed most 
private is, in fact, that which is most political. C. MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 34-36. 
Similarly, I suggest that the identification of a realm of the "private" which is beyond legal 
regulation is itself fundamentally a legal regulation. If the ideal of the classical liberal state is 
that the public realm with which men are identified should be the government oflaws, and not of 
men, then the creation of a private realm with which women are identified means that the "tradi-
tional" ideal for women is, literally, that we live under a government of men, and not of laws. 
38. See, e.g., c. HASKINS, THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY vii-ix (1927). 
39. This process is the subject of the central portion of Brundage's book, in particular his 
discussions at pp. 223-28 and 319-24. By the late fourteenth century, after the Church's mar-
riage theories had been accepted by secular society, the secular government was successful in 
reasserting jurisdiction over some sexual issues. Pp. 578-79. 
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thirteenth century, became the definitive canon and secular law of 
marriage, law which held sway until the Council of Trent in 1563. He 
does not describe in any detail either the process by which this juris-
dictional change came about, or what law was enforced and how, dur-
ing this transitional period. It is probably true that the secular arm 
did not produce jurists who codified or systematized the old law or 
who wrote legal treatises describing secular law (lawyers, like virtually 
all highly educated men, being almost exclusively clerics). Neverthe-
less, Brundage could have examined other sources. 40 
A variety of contemporary sources could have contributed to a 
fuller definition of medieval law. The secular arm operated courts and 
produced court records; court historians wrote chronicles which in-
cluded descriptions of major marital litigation between great families; 
and individuals wrote personal correspondence describing the impor-
tant events in their lives, including marriages and divorces. Brun-
dage's extensive footnotes supporting his conclusions indicate that he 
was, in fact, aware of these materials. His failure to discuss these 
other sources, particularly case law, in the analysis which forms the 
heart of his book (instead of stating his conclusions partially drawn 
from this material) may seem even more surprising in light of the fact 
that he does discuss these sources to some extent in the portions of the 
book dealing with the early and late Middle Ages. Moreover, in his 
other writings, Brundage has both examined a wide variety of sources 
and adopted a case-based approach in analyzing the practice of repro-
ductive law in the Middle Ages.41 
The period Brundage examines was also one of increased literary 
activity, and a wealth of the then-new genre of romances and other 
works are available. Although fictional, these works tend to concern 
sexual and marital matters and could serve as a mirror of the actual 
workings of medieval society. Once again, although it is apparent 
from references in the book that Brundage is familiar with these 
works, he makes only conclusory statements regarding the changing 
legal theories of marriage and how they reflect, and were influenced 
by, the changing secular perceptions of marriage and sexuality implicit 
in chivalrous romances and the ideal of courtly love.42 These com-
ments only make the reader want to know more and to question 
whether Brundage's conclusions are correct. 
40. Michael Sheehan, for example, has examined parochial (i.e., local ecclesiastic) court 
records as well as sermon books and other handbooks for parish priests to study how these new 
theories were taught to, and when they were adopted by, local clergy. Sheehan, Choice of Mar-
riage Partner in the Middle Ages: Development and Mode of a Theory of Marriage, in 1 STUDIES 
IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE HISTORY 9-15 (J. Evans ed. 1979). 
41. See, for example, Brundage's contributions to SEXUAL PRACTICES & THE MEDIEVAL 
CHURCH (V. Bullough & J. Brundage eds. 1982). 
42. The longest passage in the book concerning this interrelationship is one paragraph in a 
conclusion at the end of a chapter. Pp. 227-28. 
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Brundage discusses neither the operation of secular law in the sec-
ular courts during this transition period nor the actual application of 
canon law in the ecclesiastical courts. Although he discusses the de-
cretals of the various reformist popes, 43 who were consciously active in 
the development of canon marriage law and the expansion of Church 
jurisdiction, Brundage's discussion is limited to giving the final rule of 
law which he believes was developed in each case. His omission of a 
description of the facts of the individual cases presents the "law" as 
only that which is written in the statutes, judicial dicta, treatises of 
learned professors, and so on, and ignores its actual application in in-
dividual cases. 
Thus, Brundage uses what is probably a more restricted definition 
of law than most contemporary American legal scholars would adopt. 
Only in the application of stated rules of law to individual cases are we 
able to see the development of the law.44 Brundage "reconciles the 
43. These decretals were papal decisions in specific disputes, which were gathered together in 
case books used by the law faculties in the medieval universities. They would be roughly analo-
gous to Supreme Court decisions today. Brundage indicates that during the twelfth century, a 
significant percentage of these decretals involved marital issues. Pp. 325-37. 
44. Indeed, other writers have analyzed the facts of the cases underlying certain decretals 
and the hypotheticals used to illustrate different rules in the case books in order to explain the 
societal assumptions and the changes (or lack of changes) that the case represents. In The 
Knight, the Lady and the Priest, Georges Duby used a variety of sources to examine the facts 
underlying several notorious divorce cases (including the sensational divorce of Eleanor of Aqui-
taine from King Louis VI of France) which resulted in important decretals on marriage and 
divorce, and further used this examination to explore society and the status of women in the 
twelfth century. G. DUBY, supra note 13. The works of John Noonan, Jr., and Michael Sheehan 
are enriched by their examination of the specific hypotheticals and supporting cases used by 
Gratian, one of the earliest and most influential medieval law professors, to develop his version of 
the canon law of marital consent. Noonan, Power to Choose, 4 VIATOR 419 (1973); Sheehan, 
supra note 40, at 8-13. 
For example, Sheehan shows the originality of Gratian's theories by presenting in detail the 
facts and holdings of the precedents on which Gratian relied in his interpretation of a certain 
causa or hypothetical relating to the minimum elements constituting a legally enforceable mar-
riage - often considered the basis oflater canon law. Sheehan demonstrates that Gratian could 
have read the available precedents as only requiring true familial, as opposed to paternal, consent 
to a marriage or as requiring that paternal consent be free and uncoerced. In one case, the 
findings of fact indicated that the mother and certain other relatives had declared their opposi-
tion to the marriage and that the father may have agreed to the marriage out of fear of a superior 
lord. Sheehan, supra note 40, at 10. Similarly, the case could have been interpreted only as 
prohibiting child marriages, because the daughter, who did not give consent, was described as an 
infantula, a little girl. Instead, Gratian adopted the revolutionary theory that a marriage is not 
legally binding unless the bride consents. Id. at 8-13. 
On the other hand, Sheehan's analysis of Gratian's hypotheticals indicates that Gratian may 
not have held, as is frequently claimed, that only individual consent was required for marriage, 
because the hypotheticals and language of the holding are consistent with the rule that both 
individual and familial consent are required for marriage. This analysis helps one understand the 
development of the legal theory by showing in what ways Gratian's theories were similar to and 
different from secular marriage as actually practiced and from Church doctrine as actually 
preached. Finally, the specific factual analysis shows that Gratian in each case was concerned 
with the woman's rights in marriage; he mentioned only in passing that the rule would probably 
also apply to men. Id. at 11-12. Brundage, in contrast, comes to the same conclusions, but does 
not give the background so that the reader can follow his analysis and decide whether she agrees 
with Brundage's characterization of the legal rule. See pp. 235-42. 
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cases" for us and presents his own conclusions as to their proper inter-
pretation, but does not present the information necessary for us to 
make our own analysis. Some lawyers may be dissatisfied with this 
aspect of the book, and underestimate the contribution which Brun-
dage has, nonetheless, made. 
A greater discussion in the book of the decisions of the lower 
courts, both secular and ecclesiastic, during this period would also be 
appropriate. Despite official pronouncements as to the indissolubility 
of marriage, how many divorces were, in fact, granted? Despite eccle-
siastical prohibition of marriages within seven degrees of relationship 
without dispensations, how many "incestuous" marriages were actu-
ally permitted? Despite the fact that the canon law of adultery was 
theoretically the same for husbands and wives, how was it actually 
applied in the case law?45 Were these cases rare exceptions to the 
rules? Or were the "exceptions" in fact the norm, and the stated rule 
the exception? As I stated, Brundage does engage in this analysis in 
his discussion of the earlier and later Middle Ages, but not of the pe-
riod which is the focus of his book. 
Disappointingly, because ofBrundage's restricted definition of law, 
he does not discuss in any detail the other revolutionary societal 
change in attitudes toward sexuality and marriage which occurred 
contemporaneously with the development of canon law - the devel-
opment of courtly love and the romantic ideal.46 Brundage does men-
tion in passing that several aspects of courtly love, particularly the 
emphasis on individual choice of sexual and marital partners, the in-
creased recognition of the individual worth of women, and the concept 
that sexuality might not be all that bad after all, were consistent with 
the new canon law and probably influenced its development. He does 
not, however, attempt to reconcile those equally important aspects of 
courtly love which seem to oppose some of the most basic concepts of 
canon law: for example, the idealization of physical, adulterous love 
between young knights and the wives of their liege lords.47 If this was 
an ideal propounded by the noble laity, an ideal diametrically opposed 
to the chastity and marital fidelity demanded by canon law, then what 
was the "law" of adultery which affected these people's lives on a day-
to-day basis? 
45. Brundage notes that despite the theory that the same sexual standards were supposed to 
apply to both sexes, many canon legal theorists were inconsistent in this regard, especially in 
their discussions of the law of adultery. See, e.g., pp. 284, 306·07. He discusses some disparities 
in the late Middle Ages in the frequency with which men and women were prosecuted for adul-
tery (surprisingly, men were prosecuted more than women, but that may be because society 
tacitly permitted men to use "self-help" against their adulterous wives, while women were re-
quired to bring their claims in court), and the relative harshness with which male and female 
adulterers were punished. P. 519. 
46. See, e.g., G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 216-26. 
47. See G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 216-26; A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, supra note 20, at 
76, 82, 145; see also pp. 184-85, 204-05, 227-28, 300-01. 
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Brundage also does not discuss the effect of changes in marital law 
on marriage and se:icual customs and the peculiar social institutions 
governing feudal marriage. In particular, he fails to discuss the prac-
tice of preserving a family's wealth by forbidding younger sons, who 
did not share in the eldest brother's inheritance, to marry unless they 
were independently able to provide for a household (for example, by 
marrying a rich wife).48 Since not all of these sons were destined for 
the clergy, those "youths" (as they were called regardless of their 
age)49 were not always willing or able to abide by the canonists' exhor-
tation to chastity and were not satisfied with the pleasures afforded by 
prostitution (an institution which, Brundage points out, was fre-
quently tolerated by the medieval Church both in theory and practice 
as a necessary evil, less damaging to the fabric of society than adul-
tery) (pp. 310, 342, 389-96, 445, 463, 521-30). These youths sought an 
outlet for their sexual energies, youthful enthusiasm, and yearnings for 
the security and companionship of a permanent household. If the 
literature and chronicles of the time are to be believed, they turned to 
48. David Herlihy, by contrast, suggests that the Gregorian Reform of marriage led directly 
(although probably unintentionally) to this custom of agnatic inheritance and lineage, conjugal 
marriage, and the impoverishment of women. D. HERLIHY, supra note 15, at 86. Herlihy argues 
that prior to the Gregorian Reform, inheritance was "cognatic" (le., reckoned through the 
mother as well as the father), rather than "agnatic" (le., reckoned through the father), precisely 
because marriages were negotiated by families and were easily terminable. Family alliances fre-
quently shifted so the same individual might "belong" to different families at different times in 
his or her life. One's distaff (or maternal, the distaff being the symbol of femininity) bloodline 
could therefore be as important as one's spear (or paternal) bloodline. Mothers had an 
independent social importance and families more freely gave inheritances to daughters and 
younger sons as part of marriage strategies. Families maintained their wealth not through primo-
geniture or other limitations on inheritance rights, but by controlling monasteries and other 
church properties. Id. at 22. 
The Gregorian Reformists wrested control of Church property from the nobility who then 
had to find a way of maintaining their wealth - they did this by limiting the number of heirs 
through primogeniture (or, sometimes ultimogeniture) whereby younger (or older) sons did not 
share in an inheritance and daughters' rights were limited to dowries. Id. at 87. The Church's 
insistence on the indissolubility of marriage, coupled with primogeniture, permitted the tracing 
offamily roots to one male heir. Thus, families became agnatic (or, as Duby would characterize 
it, agnatic lineage was superimposed upon cognatic lineage, which survived to some extent). As a 
result, women's importance in the family line diminished. The number of marriageable noble-
men declined, as fewer men were wealthy enough to marry, and as the marriage market for 
women tightened, dowries became larger. At the same time, women lost control of their dowries 
in marriage. See id. at 82-103. Dante gives a similar account of the development of his own 
family from a cognatic structure (using a matronymic) to an agnatic structure (using a patro-
nymic) and the simultaneous loss of economic power of Florentine daughters. DANTE, THE 
DIVINE COMEDY: PARADISO, Canto xv, lines 103-05 (G. Bickersteth trans. 1932). 
49. Duby gives several examples of men described as "youths" (juvenes) in contemporary 
chronicles and literature who were actually in their mid-forties, a fairly advanced age in medieval 
times. Those unfortunate younger sons who were neither attractive, skillful, nor lucky enough to 
woo an heiress or otherwise acquire sufficient wealth to maintain a household lived out their days 
in perpetual adolescence traveling from castle to castle (they were generally not welcome at their 
parents' and siblings' homes) to enter tournaments and, at best, play the traditional role of 
avunculus (maternal uncle), educating their more fortunate nephews in "youth" culture. One of 
the reasons for the crusades propounded at the time (not a modem interpretation) is that they 
got rid of the excess "youths." G. DUBY, THE CHIVALROUS SOCIETY 112-22 (C. Postan trans. 
1977). 
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means absolutely unacceptable to canon lawyers: adultery, abduction, 
and concubinage.50 Was canon law, which protected a woman's right 
to choose her own husband and which made it easier for younger sons 
to seduce and marry heiresses, partially a response to this social prob-
lem? Or, as David Herlihy suggests, were the impoverishment of wo-
men and other social problems of the later Middle Ages the result of 
the change in marriage law?51 Or did the strict rules of canon law lead 
to the gradual abandonment of these restrictions on younger sons in 
the later Middle Age? 
Brundage's decision not to discuss in detail these societal influ-
ences in the High Middle Ages should not undermine the importance 
of his original contribution to the study of this period by reliance en-
tirely on original legal texts. Indeed, there are many intriguing studies 
of the social influences of the High Middle Ages and Brundage may 
have intentionally decided to supplement this work by concentrating 
his efforts on making available materials which were inaccessible for 
centuries. Brundage's use of original documents for this core part of 
the book is one of his most valuable contributions. Indeed, I cannot 
overemphasize the Herculean labor Brundage has accomplished, por-
ing over innumerable ancient - in most cases handwritten - Latin 
manuscripts containing probably some of the most turgid material 
ever written, in order to give as complete as possible a presentation of 
the legal scholarship of the time. I fear, however, that Brundage's in-
sistence on using only original materials for this section may have ac-
tually weakened it through his failure to put the materials in the 
context of the time. 
A final caution about the book is that a casual reader might be 
initially discouraged by what seems at first blush to be a lack of consis-
tency in approach throughout. For the earlier and later time periods 
covered in the book, Brundage does in fact discuss secular law and 
custom and, to a certain extent, discusses individual cases and even 
refers occasionally to literary materials. However, for the period of 
Brundage's greatest expertise, Brundage limits his discussion to these 
original texts. Brundage warns his audience in his foreword that, in a 
way, the book is really three separate books: "a monograph (Chapters 
6-9) wrapped in a survey (Chapters 1-5, 10-11) with a final segment 
(Chapter 12) that summarizes the whole thing and draws conclusions 
50. Id. at 119-22; see also G. DUBY, supra note 13, at 216; A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE, 
supra note 20, at 76. 
51. See D. HERLIHY, supra note 15, at 81. By the thirteenth century, society was perceived 
to have an excess of unmarriageable women caused by the changes in family structure, changes 
which many historians link to the rise of new religious groupings for women, such as the Be-
guines. This "problem" was known as the Frauen/rage ("the woman question"). Bolton, Mu-
/ieres Sanctae, in WOMEN IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY, supra note 13, at 147-48; Stuard, supra note 
13, at 8-11. Caroline Walker Bynum gives a feminist twist to the Frauen/rage: "If daughters 
were increasingly a problem for families, it stands to reason that family was increasingly a prob-
lem to daughters." c.w. BYNUM, HOLY FEAST AND HOLY FAST 225 (1987). 
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from it" (p. xx). · One cannot, therefore, use this book to compare dif-
ferent periods of the Middle Ages to each other. 
Brundage may be justified in objecting that my criticism merely 
reflects my desire to read a different book than the one he chose to 
write, and that I am not analyzing on its own merits the book that he 
in fact wrote. This is partially correct, but to a large extent when read-
ing the book I had the impression that Brundage, or at least his editor, 
appears not to have understood what the book really was about. The 
title of the book, its foreword, and the breadth of its discussion 
throughout indicate that the book is a discussion of both the law of 
sexuality, in its broader meaning of constituting actual practice in ad-
dition to legislation, and the culture of marriage throughout the Mid-
dle Ages. However, Brundage's book is really something much 
narrower: it is an intellectual history of the ideas of a handful of ca-
non jurists who Brundage believes (correctly, in my view) have pro-
foundly influenced our modem laws and superstitions concerning 
marriage, sex, and gender. This perspective explains not only the 
structure of the book, but also the choice of subject matter and the 
definition of terms used. 
In the first section of the book, Brundage discusses in great detail 
the antecedents of the decretists of this period. He discusses in great 
length not only the secular sex law and customs of the Romans and 
the Germanic tribes of Europe, and of the Frankish and other early 
medieval kingdoms, but also the writings of the early Church fathers 
and the penitentials and other religious writings of earlier periods. 
When Brundage reaches the period in which these theorists were 
working, he switches to a discussion of their theories as they presented 
them in their own writing. How these theories were applied in prac-
tice, what other competing secular theories existed at the same time, 
and the actual jurisdiction of these theories as laws at this time are not 
relevant to this discussion. In other words, for the eleventh through 
thirteenth centuries Brundage discusses only one branch of legal the-
ory and makes no attempt to discuss the law of sexuality as a general 
matter, let alone sex or Christian society. Brundage then returns to a 
broader discussion of the law and society of later periods in order to 
explore the influence that these theorists had on later European law -
now conceived in the broader sense of actual practice - and, most 
importantly to Brundage, on modem American law. Thus, Brundage 
tries to present the legal theories of a certain group of men, and he 
gives the historical, legal, and social antecedents, and the legal and 
social consequences. 
Brundage's definition of law may also be seen as a result of histori-
cal integrity. The High Middle Ages were the dawn of the develop-
ment of organized legal faculties and the study of law as a separate 
branch of inquiry. By restricting himself to that which medieval legal 
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scholars perceived as legal discourse, he correctly avoids the error of 
"doing history backwards" - that is, imposing modem sensibilities on 
an imaginary past and interpreting historical societies not in their own 
terms, but only as though they were inevitable evolutionary precursors 
of our society.52 In fact, it is only extremely recently, and thanks in 
large, but by no means exclusive, part to the work of feminist legal 
scholars, that American legal scholars have begun to take a broad in-
terdisciplinary approach to law, ceasing to study law as consisting en-
tirely of statutes and appellate opinions. 
Because of the limitations on the scope of the material covered by 
Brundage, readers who are not already ·familiar with the available 
literature on medieval scholarship may need to read this book in con-
junction with a book that describes the culture of this period in greater 
detail in order to place canon law theory in context. For example, 
Georges Duby's The Knight, The Lady and The Priest, 53 through its 
examination of several notorious divorce cases, discusses the struggle 
of the Church to gain jurisdiction over marriage and divorce litigation 
and to influence secular attitudes toward marriage in the twelfth cen-
tury. The second volume of A History of Private Life, entitled Revela-
tions of the Medieval World, 54 once again edited by Duby, examines 
the development of marriage and the status of women in the broader 
context of what is sometimes referred to as the "discovery of the self," 
the development of the concept of the autonomous individual through 
the Middle Ages. 
In sum, Brundage's book is vital for those who would develop a 
jurisprudence of feminism. I give much credit to the book for inspir-
ing what I call my "historicist" perspective toward a body of recent 
feminist work. Although the story of the development of medieval sex 
law is extremely complicated, and lends itself to many interpretations, 
I believe it leads to an account of gender stereotypes which should give 
pause to modem feminist writers. The account suggests that a varia-
tion of today's feminine virtues, such as relational thinking, intercon-
nectedness, and, indeed, an ethic of car~ 55 were touted in the Middle 
Ages as masculine virtues. Further, patriarchy was capable of expro-
priating medieval feminine values, such as individualism, and trans-
forming them into legitimatLt1g virtues that served patriarchy. This 
accentuates the need to develop a jurisprudence that is not dependent 
52. In her excellent study of medieval English peasant life, Barbara Hanawalt cites anthro-
pologist Jack Goody as the originator of this wonderfully apt description of the "ethnocentrism 
of modernism" which can be found in many histories of family life. B. HANAWALT, THE TIES 
THAT BOUND 10 (1986). 
53. G. DUBY, supra note 13. 
54. 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: REVELATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD, supra note 
20. 
55. See supra note 5; see also c. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); N. NODDINGS, 
CARING (1984). 
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upon definitions of a female-male dichotomy, which is itself a patriar-
chal account, but which develops a theory capable of accommodating 
difference without defining ourselves and our virtue exclusively 
through difference. 
Those of us who are dedicated to the feminist critique of contem-
porary American jurisprudence should not see historicism as a dispir-
iting attack on the work of feminist legal theoreticians to date. 
Rather, it should be seen as a verification of the most important in-
sights of feminism to date: the inadequacy of conventional jurispru-
dence to understand and explain women, the failure of jurisprudence 
to question its own assumptions and its own perspective, and the fail-
ure of jurisprudence even to see, let alone explain, the suffering and 
oppression of women and their domination by men. Historicism ex-
poses the lie that conventional jurisprudence is sex-neutral, scientific, 
and value-free. 
Still, more important for the future, historicism should be seen as a 
challenge not to fall into the same errors as the jurisprudes whom we 
criticize: failure to recognize the cultural perspective from which we 
view ourselves, unquestioning acceptance that our unmediated exper-
iences have a universal or essentialist application, and acceptance of a 
static and mutually ex<?lusive theory of gender which can only be re-
strictive on an individual level and lead to continued patterns of domi-
nance and submission on a societal level. Brundage's book is a 
valuable advance toward that aim. 
